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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

R. M. SCOVILLE,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 7824

KELLOGG SALES COMPANY,
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts have been fully set forth in appellant's and
respondent's briefs, as well as being reviewed in the majority and the dissenting opinions of this court. For this rea-

son the facts are not set forth again herein.

3
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1.
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN THE CASE WAS THE
PLAINTIFF'S ONLY, AND, THERE BEING NO DISPUTE, THE
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE THE COURT VIEW
THE EVIDENCE IN ANY MORE FAVORABLE LIGHT THAN
HIS OWN TESTIMONY PROVIDES.
POINT 2.
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF ASSENTED TO THE TERMS
OF THE 1949 BONUS PLAN OR NOT IS IMMATERIAL, FOR
IN EITHER INSTANCE RULES OF LAW APPLY.
POINT 3.
THE DEFENSES OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION AND
ACCOUNT STATED ARE RULES OF LAW FOR THE COURT
TO APPLY AND NOT QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR A JURY
TO DETERMINE.
POINT 4.
THE COURT IMPROPERLY AMENDED THE FACTS ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL.
POINT 5.
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IS A RULE OF EVIDENCE
TO BE APPLIED BY THE COURT AND THE COURT IS BOUND
BY THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH EVIDENCE SUBJECT TO
SUCH RULE WAS INTRODUCED BY THE PLAINTIFF.

POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN THE CASE
WAS THE PLAINTIFF'S ONLY, AND, THERE
BEING NO DISPUTE, THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE THE COURT VIEW THE EVIDENCE IN ANY MORE FAVORABLE LIGHT THAN
HIS OWN TESTIMONY PROVIDES.
The defendant respectfully submits that subsequent
to the introduction of evidence by the plaintiff, and before any ·evidence had been introduced by the defendant,
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the defendant moved the court for an i~voluntary dismissal under Rule 41 (h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
or a directed verdict. This was granted by the court. ·
The only evidence in this case is that of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff cannot have the benefit of the evidence most
favorable to him to the exclusion of that evidence which
he also introduced and which is inconsistent with any ·
otherwise favorable evidence. The testimony of a witness is no stronger than it is left by his further examination
or his cross-examination.
In Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Insurance Co., 91 Utah
405, 64 P. (2d) 351, (Utah 1937) this court quoted from ,
Fowler v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 16 Utah 348, 52 P.
594, 596:

**

If there be a contradiction, it arises
from the plaintiff's own testimony. In such a case,
where a nonsuit is asked, the trial court may con.,.
sider such testimony true as bears the most strongly ·
against the interest of the plaintiff.'"
u c::.

This court then quoted and reaffirmed the rule laid
down as follows:
uin Putnam v. Industrial Commission, 80
Utah 187, 14 P. (2d) 973, 981, this court says:
(( (In considering the testimony of the applicant on the issue as to whose employ he was in,
we must look, not alone to the answers made by
him to leading questions, or on assumptions that
he was in the employ of Putnam, but to the whole
of the testimony bearing on the subject. As to
that, the familiar rule is applicable that testimony
of a witness on his direct examination is no stronger
5
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than as modified or left by his further examination
or by his cross-examination. A particular part of.
his testimony may not be singled out to the exclusion of other parts of equal importance bearing
on the subject.'
uln Corpus Juris the rule is again stated:
u tTo determine whether the evidence makes
an issue of fact, the whole of the evidence and not
merely certain selected parts thereof is to be considered.' "
If plaintiff introduced evidence, or agreed to its introduction during cross-examination, or testified to certain
facts and circumstances, he is bound by such evidence. 32

C.].S., Sec. 1040, pp. 1104, 1111.

POINT II.
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF ASSENTED TO
THE TERMS OF THE 1949 BONUS PLAN OR NOT
IS IMMATERIAL, FOR IN EITHER INSTANCE
RULES OF LAW APPLY.
There is no contradiction nor dispute of any kind
upon which reasonable minds could differ as to the following facts and circumstances which were proved by the
plaintiff:
1.

The Bonus Plan for 1948 contained these limita-

tions:

c( (

u* * * As we discussed in our meeting at Battle Creek, the Bonus Plan for 1948 will be as follows. * * *
6
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uof course this means that we will look at
the situation at the end of 1948 and see if this is
the best possible bonus arrangement, both from the
standpoint of the individual salesman and the Kellogg Company :.~ '~ :.~" (Ex. rrA").
2.

The 1949 Bonus Plan contained these limitations:
((The Bonus Plan covered in Bulletin No.
148-3, dated January 29, 1948, expired as of December 31, 1948. The Bonus Plan for 1949 which
we feel is fair to all concerned is as follows: :f- * :f.
((The above Bonus Plan covers 1949 operations
only." (Ex. ffB")

3. The plaintiff received both of the foregoing plans
and in each instance continued to work for the defendant.
He worked for the defendant for some 17 months after
receiving the 1949 Bonus Plan.

4. In January of 1950 plaintiff received a letter referring to the 1949 Bonus Plan. This letter also referred
to a conversation which he had had about the 1949 plan:

((Dear Ray:

ttWe are discontinuing bonus plan which was
in effect and we will not have a bonus plan for 1950.
We are advancing your salary, effective January 1,
1950 from $325.00 to $375.00 per month. This
will confirm our recent conversation. * * *" (Ex.
3)

5. On January 30, 1950 the plaintiff received a
check and a letter in payment for the 1949 bonus and in
accordance with the 1949 Bonus Plan. The letter unmistakably contained an invitation to object, if such objection he had:

7
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uPlease find enclosed our check in the amount
of $3544.35 to cover bonus. for the year 1949. * * *
uy t was necessary to go ahead and clean this
matter up based on the figures we have, but subject
to revision·, if the figures you are sending prove
ours to be incorrect. We will appreciate having you
forward Helen's figures (plaintiff's wife who kept
his files,· books and records) as soon as possible so
we can check this out, but we did have to close our
books for 1949 and that is the reason for going
ahead and making the calculation." (Ex. 6)
6. Plaintiff returned the foregoing check because
no withholding tax had been deducted, and on February 6,
1950 a check in the amount of $2,981.92 was drawn by
the Kellogg Sales Company in favor of the plaintiff. He
received, endorsed and cashed the check. (R. 48, Ex. 4)
Later, on April 24th, another check for the balance due on his 1949 bonus was drawn and transmitted
to the plaintiff with the following specific information:
7.

((::· ::· ::· Attached find check in the amount of
$1,026.88 representing the balance due on your
bonus for 1949." (Ex. 8)
Plaintiff received, endorsed and cashed that check.
The foregoing facts stand undisputed in the record,
testified to by the plaintiff.
This court states in its majority opinion that ((Scoville
denies that he assented to the terms of the Bonus Plan for
1949." The foregoing facts must be considered without
the benefit of any favorable light in determining whether
such assent existed or not. Any statements made or let8:
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..

ters written upon which plaintiff relies as negativing an
assent are as follows:
November 4, 1948 at breakfast in Portland, Oregon, plain tiff testifies that Mr. Borsum said:
1.

u* * * tThat is a lot of feed.' I said: tknow it,
and it is going to mean a lot of hard work,' and
I said: tWith the bonus :figured the way they are
now, I am also going to make a lot of money, around
$30,000.00.'
.
uHe said: he tdidn't see any reason why the
bonus should be changed at that time, there was
nothing that should be changed in the set up, for
1949.'" (Italics ours) (R. 23, 24)

On April 16, 1949 in plaintiff's hotel room in

2.

Omaha Mr. Scoville said:
ul said: tyou are also going to pay me a lot
of bonus too.' He said: tWe have got money to pay
the bonus, you sell the feed.'

*

==·

*

ul said: tBill (apparently W. H. Williams), it
will take a lot of feed and I will get a lot of bonus,
it is pretty near time to shut off out there.'
uHe said, tWe will take care of you, Kellogg
has got plenty of money and we will make the
feed."' (R. 25, 26)
In July or August, 1949, at a sales meeting in
Omaha, and, according to Mr. Scoville, just a ·few days
before he received the 1949 Bonus Plan, he had the following conversation:
3.

uA. I asked Mr. Borsum if it was going to
make any difference with my territory, as I was
9
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told several times my territory operated different
than anything back there.
uHe said, cNo, we will work that out, whatever change is made I will let you know.'
uAnd he said: ci don't think it will make a
bit of change, Ray, in your set up.' " (R. 27)
4. On July 24, 1949, according to Mr. Scoville's
testimony, he had written a letter discussing the 1949
Bonus Plan. This letter said in part:
u,z. * * Also your letter of July 11, regarding
the bonus plan, which of course is very important
to me, I have read it very carefully, but I am not
ready· to give you my thoughts on it, for my feed
business is practically assured ... from the start.
And from the wording of this letter I can see where
it could be changed to where I would not get any
bonus. * * * " (Ex. 10)
He received the following response to his letter:
u:>:. * * With further reference to the bonus
plan for 1949, you are practically assured of one
and a good one at that." (Ex. 11)
At the trial Mr. Scoville testified, in response to a
question as to whether after receiving the 1949 Bonus
Plan he had entered a protest or talked with any of the
officials of the company, as follows:
((Not at the-I wrote them a letter at that
time but there was nothing more said about it."
(R. 28)
"

5. By plaintiff's own testimony the only indication
of a conversation about the 1949 plan after its receipt was
on January 9, 1950, some five to six months after the

10
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1949 Bonus Plan must have been received. This conversation was at a turkey show in Minneapolis, Minnesota and
Mr. Scoville testified to the following conversation:
((Mr. Borsum told me I would have to follow
the new schedule of the bonus which was issued
in August, that he had sent out, and that he didn't
think it was a good thing that I should make any
trouble about it or say anything, or discuss it, because that is the way it was and that is the way it
had to be.
((That if anything was said, if I took it up with
the higher ups both him and Mr. Williams and myself would all lose our jobs, and if I kept my mouth
shut I could stay on indefinitely as long as I was
doing the job." (R. 29)
Thereafter the checks and letters heretofore described
followed. Seventeen months after receiving the Bonus Plan,
and nearly a year after receipt of the first check, comes
the first protest, written to an official of the Kellogg Company. In that letter plaintiff refers to the Bonus Plan of
1949 and acknowledges receipt of it. He avers that the
conversations he had with Mr. Borsum and Mr. Williams
several times regarding how this would affect him, made
the plan inapplicable to him. A material portion of that
letter is as follows:
u~.

*

~·

This bonus plan was not changed until
July 1949, at which time my feed was practically
all sold for 1949, and this letter was sent out by
Mr. L. C. Borsum saying the company had changeq
their minds regarding the 1948 bonus plan, and
making this change retroactive to January 1st,
1949. Now Mr. Roll, I had talked with both Mr.
Williams and Mr. Borsum several times regarding
11
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how this would effect (sic) me, and each told me it
made absolutely no difference as long as I sold the
feed, but especially in April of 1949 did I discuss
this with ~hem at a sales meeting in Omaha, and was
assured again that it made no difference, that I
would g~t the $2.00 per ton bonus on all feed I sold
that year. 'And at th~t time I gave them ,approximately what. the figures for the year 1949 would
be." (Ex. 1'2)
A comparison of the conversations testified to by
- the .Pl.aintiff with the cha_rges ~a~e in th~ letter leaves
- no doubt in reasonable minds as to what was said. The
plaintiff testified to the conversations and, apparently in
their entirety, such statem~~ts as, c~He didn't see any
reason why the bonus should be changed at that time,
there was nothing that should be changed in the setup
. for 1949," uwe have got the money to pay the bonus, you
sell the feed," uwhatever change is made we will let you
know," are phrases from plaintiff's testimony. Th~y testify
to a change and the anticipation of one on the part of the
plaintiff..Certainly ~hey cannot be construed to mean anything other than they say. In connection with this there
can be no denial or misinterpretation of the phrase in the
1948 Bonus Plan that uAs we discussed in our meetil)g at
- Battle Creek the Bonus Plan for 1948 will be as follows:"
. and uof c-;>urse this means that we will lao~ at the· situation at the ~nd of 194.8 ~"' * * ."
rhe~e can be no question upon which r.easonable
.minds cou~d differ as to the testi.J;ll~ny of the plaintiff.
His knowledge of the 1948 and the 1949 pl~n, his accept-

~nce ~£ '~il the ~he~ks, ·.end~,_-sing and cashing them, and

_ his ·information that they were paid on the basis of the
12
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1949 plan, leaves nothing upon which any different conclusion could be based.

Regarpless of the foregoing, the majority opinion indicates that the question of whether plaintiff assented to
the terms of the 1949 plan or not was fpr a jury to determine. We respectfully submit that whether plaintiff did
or did not assent thereto is immaterial, for in either instance a rule of law, not a question of £,act, becomes applicable. If plaintiff did not assent to the 1949 plan prior
to the acceptance of the checks and the statements, then
a dispute existed, and the rule of law of accord and satisfaction applies. If plaintiff accepted the Bonus Plan of
1949 then he cannot subsequently repudiate it, and the
rule of law of an ~ccount stated applies.
The very recent case of W eis v. Duro Chrome Corp.,
207 F. (2d) 298 (C.C.A. 8th, October 14, 1953), will illustrate the application of accord and satisfaction and is
~rectly in point. In that case an employee brought an .
action against his employer to recover the difference be~een the amount of commissions originally provided in
his employment contract and the amount he received after
a reduction of the commissions by the employer. In affirming a judgment adverse to the employee the court held:

* ::· In April,

1947, plaintiff and defendant
entered into a written contract by the terms of
which defendant employed plaintiff to solicit
orders for the defendant's products in the territory therein described upon a commission basis
under a schedule therein contained. The contract
contained the following provision:
u::.

'We (defendant) reserve the right to change
commtsstons, discounts, or prices at any time we
u

13
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may deem necessary without giving prior noticeregardless of existing catalogue, bulletin or circular
prices (either net or list) as shown in any printed or
typewritten literature which may be· in your possession or in the hands of the trade.' The contract
also contained a provision that it might be terminated by either party on 30 days notice in writing.
Plaintiff's commissions as provided by the written
contract were 10%. On January 28, 1948, claiming to act pursuant to the above quoted provision
of the contract, defendant gave written notice to
plaintiff of a reduction in his commissions from 1O%
to 8%, and on December 3, 1948, by written notice
defendant advised plaintiff of a further reduction
in his commissions to 7~ %. During all the times
here involved defendant sent to plaintiff monthly
statements showing a complete record of the business written the previous month and the percentage
upon which the commissions were based, and enclosed a ·check for commissions as shown. These
checks were cashed by the plain tiff and so far as
appears from the record without protest for more
than one year, the plaintiff stating in his testimony
that he thought the difference between the commissions stated in the contract and the reduced rate
was being accumulated until the defendant was
operating at a profit. In the present action plaintiff
seeks to recover the difference between the amount
of commissions calculated at 10% as originally provided in the contract and the amount which he
received under the reductions made by defendant.

* * *
u* ::- ::- In the course of performance of the
contract subsequent to the action of defendant in
reducing plaintiff's commissions, plaintiff received
compensation evidenced by checks based upon the
14
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reduced schedule of commissions. These checks were
received and cashed by him. In these circumstances
he cannot now be heard to contend that they were
not accepted by him in full payment. The statements specifically indicated the amount due plaintiff and the checks received and accepted by him
represent that amount. It is contended by plaintiff,
however, that the acceptance and cashing of the
checks by him did not estop him from seeking to
recover what he now claims to be due him because
the amount due was a liquidated amount. The
trouble with this contention is that the amount
claimed to be due was not liquidated. There was
a denial by the defendant that any amount in excess of the amounts shown by the statements and
checks submitted was due him. If there was any
reasonable contention between the parties as to the
correct amount due plaintiff the submission of these
statements with the checks amounted to an accord
and when accepted by the defendant the transaction constituted an accord and satisfaction. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Rau Const. Co., supra; McGregor
v. J. A. Ware Const. Co., 188 Mo. 611, 87 S. W.
981; Zinke v. Knights of the Maccabees, 275 Mo.
660, 205 S. W. 1; Whitmire v. Lawrence, etc., Mo.
App., 286 S. W. 842; Ellis v. Mansfield, 215 Mo.
App. 292, 256 S. W. 165."
See California Bean Growers' Association v. Rindge Land
& Navigation Co., 248 Pac. 658, 47 A.L.R. 904, (Cal.
1926); Benites v. Ha1npton, 3 Utah 369; Ashton v. Skeen,
85 Utah 489, 39 P. (2d) 1073 (1935); Ralph A. Badger &
Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass'n., 94 Uta!J 97, 75 P.
(2d) 669 ( 19 3 8) ; Bro1vning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.
of the United States, 94 Utah 532,72 P. (2d) 1060 (Utah,
1937); Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 90 Utah 405,

15
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64 P. (2J) 351 (Utah, 1937); Bell v. ].ones, 100 Utah
87, 110 P. (2d) 327 (Utah 1941). See, also, the annotations at 34 A.L.R. 1035, 1036, and 75 A.L.R. 905, both

annotations being -referred to in State, et al. v. Campbell
]3/dg. Co., et _al., 94 Utah 326, 77 P. (2d) 341 (Utah
1938). In the annotation of 34 A.L.R. at page 1036, the
g~neral rule is given:
uBy the great weight of authority the acceptance .and use of a remittance by check, purporting
to be cin full,' or employing words of similar import,
or accompanied by a letter to that effect, amount
to an accord <and satisfaction of the larger claim
of the creditor, assuming that the claim was unliquidated or di~puted, so that an express agreement
to accept, and the actual acceptance of, the smaller
amount in full satisfaction, would have been binding."
As hereafter pointed out, the dissenting opinion sets
out this rule of law and quotes it quite fully from Corbin
on Contracts.
Defendant is entitled to the benefit of any controversies in the evidence produced by the cross-examination
or in plaintiff's own evidence. The burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff to establish his case. If plaintiff, in
support of such burden, created a question of fact for
a jury susceptible of two interpretations, we submit that
he is not entitled to select the interpretation most favorable to him.
· The majority opinion indicates that the question as
to whether plaintiff's action constituted an acceptance or
not was a question for the jury. It is apparent that regardless of the determination of the jury as to that fact,
16
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such determination would lead only to an application of
a rule of law by the court that accord and satisfaction
had been reached or that an account stated resulted.

POINT III.
THE DEFENSES OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION AND ACCOUNT STATED ARE RULES OF
LAW FOR THE COURT TO APPLY AND NOT
QUESTIONS OF FACT FOR A JURY TO DETERMINE.
The majority opinion states that whether plaintiff's
actions constituted an accord and satisfaction, or whether
his actions bound him to an account stated, are questions
for the jury.
We again point out that all the testimony in this case
was adduced by the plaintiff. The weight of authority
as to whether such defenses are rules of law when applied
to uncontroverted facts adduced at trial, is in favor of
such application as a rule of law. The majority opinion
seems to indicate that the application of such rules, including the rule of estoppel, is a question of law for the
court, when it said:
u.As to the estoppel claimed by the defendant,
it is difficult to find in the record any representation knowingly made by plaintiff upon which he
intended defendant to rely and which the defendant, having done so, acted to its legal detriment."
This would seem to preclude the application of the rule
of law to the facts in the case as adduced by the plaintiff.
Conversely, such language would indicate that the facts

17
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support the application of the rule of law of accord and
satisfaction and accounts stated.
The dissenting opinion disagrees with the majority
as to whether it was a jury question on accord and satisfaction and quotes from Corbin On Contracts, Sec. 1279,

Vol. 6, p. 9 7:
uwhere the amount due is in dispute, and the
debtor sends cash or check for less than the amount
claimed, clearly expressing his intention that it
is sent as a settlement in full, and not on account
or in part payment, the retention and use of the
money or the cashing of the check is almost always held to be an acceptance of the offer operating as full satisfaction, even though the creditor
may assert or send word to the debtor that the sum
is received only in part payment. The creditor's action in such case is quite inconsistent with his words.
It may, indeed, be clear that he does not in fact
assent to the offer made by the debtor, so that there
is no actual (meeting of the minds.' But this is
merely another illustration of the fact that the
making of a contract frequently does not require
such an actual meeting. . . . It has seemed to the
courts more beneficial to hold that the creditor's
action speaks louder than his words and is operative
as an acceptance of the offer as made.
uThe cashing, or the certification, of a check
expressly sent in full settlement of a disputed
claim, operates as an accord and satisfaction if, a~
the time, no word of dissent is sent to the party
offering it in satisfaction.
uin these cases it is held that it makes no difference that the creditor did not know that the effect
of his cashing the check or keeping the money
18
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would be the discharge of his entire claim. This
is supported by fundamental legal doctrine. The
acceptance of an offer makes a contract even
though the parties do not know the law or the
legal consequences of their agreement."
Other authorities agreeing with the dissenting opinion
are numerous and appear to represent the great weight of
authority. In 1 C.J.S., Sec. 49, pp. 567, 569, the rule of
law is stated at page 567:
uwhere there is substantially no dispute as to
the facts on which a claim of accord and satisfaction is based, the question of the creditor's assent
is one of law to be determined by the court."
At page 569 the following rule of law is giv~n:
uThe court may direct a verdict for defendant
where he has established accord and satisfaction by
conclusive and undisputed evidence, or where the
facts in evidence give rise to a conclusive presumption of acceptance in satisfaction; but it may and
should refuse to do so where accord and satisfaction
has not been proved or where the question is one
for determination by the jury, as where the evidence is in conflict or the facts necessary to establish accord and satisfaction are in dispute."

POINT IV.
THE COURT IMPROPERLY AMENDED THE
FACTS ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL.
The majority opinion contains the following statement in summarizing the testimony of the plaintiff:
19
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u* :lZ. :l!· That he saw no reason why the bonus
· should he changed at that time and that nothing
would be changed in the 1949 setup."
We respectfully submit that the use of the word uwould"
is incorrect. Mt. Scoville, in his testimony, used the word
ushould." The dissenting opinion discusses this change in
the testimony. The word ushould" imparts the flavor of
umight be" to the conversation. This flavor continues
throughout subsequent conversations and attacks any inference that the 1948 Bonus Plan uwould not" be changed.
Conjecture and speculation arise to cloud any probability.
POINT V.
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IS A RULE OF
EVIDENCE TO BE APPLIED BY THE COURT AND
THE COURT IS BOUND BY THE PURPOSE FOR
WHICH EVIDENCE SUBJECT TO SUCH RULE WAS
INTRODUCED BY THE PLAINTIFF.
In passing on the question of the admissibility of
statements made by the plaintiff and others prior to the
issuance of the Bonus Plan for 1949 under the parol evidence rule, the majority opinion designates the statements
as relating to the question of acceptance or non-acceptance
of the 1949 Bonus Plan. The majority opinion states:
uDefendant urges that the trial court did no~
err in striking as inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, all statements made prior to issuance of
the cBonus Plan for 1949,' whether they had resulted in agreement or not, since they were merged
in the later agreement. Such contention assumes the
most important fact in this case,-whether Scoville
accepted the terms of the cBonus Pla1J. for 1949.'
20
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The facts most favorable to plaintiff are not such
as would require all reasonable minds to conclude
that there was such an acceptance, hence whether
Scoville's actions were such as to constitute an acceptance also was a jury question."
The rule governing the inadmissibility of parol evidence is directed not at an assumption nor the end result
or interpretation of the proffered evidence. Whether
Scoville accepted the 1949 Bonus Plan or not does not
alter the admissibility of statements made prior to its
issuance. The importance of applying the parol evidence
rule lies in the court's statement that such contention assumes the most important fact in this case,-whether
Scoville accepted the terms of the Bonus Plan for 1949.
It stands uncontradicted in the record that the purpose
for which such evidence was introduced by the plaintiff
was in an attempt to vary the 1949 Bonus Plan. We respectfully submit that the trial court and this court was
and is bound to accept the purpose and intent for which
such evidence was introduced as specifically and undeniably
offered by the plain tiff.

uMR. CALLISTER: If the court please, it
is no attempt to vary the written contract, it is an
attempt to vary one not received until July or
August, 1949. This conversation took place the
latter part of 1948." (R. 23)

We respectfully submit that it does not now lie in the
province of this court to state that such evidence was
offered to indicate lack of assent to the 1949 plan, when
it was specifically announced by plaintiff in open court
that its purpose was to vary the 1949 plan.
21
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To hold that such parol evidence is admissible because to strike it might -eliminate the possibility that reasonable minds would have to conclude that there was no
acceptance, seems to overrule the parol evidence rule as
such has been established and adopted by this court and
applied many times. Certainly the admissibility of such
evidence is a question for the trial court, not the jury, and
should be separated from the effect such evidence, if admitted, might have on the acceptance or lack of acceptance
on the part of the plaintiff. Not only was the evidence
not introduced by the plaintiff for such purpose, but the
question of acceptance or non-acceptance should properly
be determined from the statements and actions of the
plaintiff and others subsequent to the 1949 Bonus Plan
after it was received and acknowledged by the plaintiff.
The evidence is admissible or not admissible under the
parol evidence rule, and whether its effect assumes the
most important fact in the case does not alter its admissibility under such rule. To hold otherwise seems to
adulterate the purpose of the parol eviden.ce rule and
overules it as it has been accepted and established in the
courts of this state and every other jurisdiction of the
country.

In Hogan v. Swayze, 65 Ut. 380, 230 P. 1097 (Utah
1925), this court said:

celt may be said in passing, however, that the
rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the
terms of a plain, unambiguous instrument, in writing, is elementary in this and every other jurisdiction of the country."
22
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1:

'·

CONCLUSION
The majority opinion considered the evidence in the
light most favorable to plaintiff's theory of the case. This
court should not have so viewed the evidence where the
only evidence adduced was that of the plaintiff, and
there being no dispute in the evidence defendant was entitled to the benefit of any discrepancies, contradictions
or testimony supporting the defenses and objections raised
at the trial. Plaintiff was bound by such testimony, unfavorable though it may be.
Plaintiff's undisputed evidence showed he anticipated
and received the 1949 Bonus Plan, that he thereafter discussed it, received a statement of his bonus thereunder,
together with checks therefor, which checks he endorsed
and cashed without protest. He received the 1949 Bonus
Plan some seventeen months before registering any complaint and he had received statements and cashed checks
without complaint until nearly a year had elapsed. The
evidence he alone adduced established the defense of accord and satisfaction or account stated.
Whether he assented to the 1949 Bonus Plan or not
is immaterial, for if it could possibly be found from the
evidence that he did not assent to the 1949 Bonus Plan
then a dispute existed and accord and satisfaction applies
precluding recovery. On the other hand, if it were found
that he did not assent, then he· cannot be heard to repudiate
the 1949 Bonus Plan and an account stated precludes his
recovery.
Accord and satisfaction and account stated are rules
of law to be applied by the court and not questions of
23
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fact for the jury where the facts are not in dispute. The
facts cannot be in dispute in this case where such were
adduced by plaintiff alone.
The majority opinion substituted the word uwould"
for the word ushould" and neither the inference such a
word as uwould" might otherwise support nor the substance of the word itself is found in the record.
The parol evidence rule should be applied to the evidence introduced by the plaintiff where the specific purpose for which such evidence was introduced was announced by the plaintiff in open court. Evidence of conversations had prior to and purporting to vary a written
instrument is inadmissible under the parol evidence rule,
and this is so regardless of any possible indications of intent
to accept such instrument which might be otherwise inferred from the substance of such conversations. The
majority opinion in effect overrules the parol evidence
rule and the decisions heretofore given by this court approving the rule in this jurisdiction.
We respectfully submit to this court that the dissenting opinion not only recognizes that the facts stand
undisputed in the record as having been introduced by
the plaintiff alone, but also correctly states the law applicable to such facts. The petition for rehearing should be
granted and the judgment of the lower court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
GRANT C. AADNESEN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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